things. One is regroup, because I think the public is going to be outraged by this action tonight and bring to the floor a true bipartisan bill or all the bills, and allow all of them that were not discussed here today to be voted on. We can do that by signing the discharge petition, and I hope my colleagues have; I know I have and many others have.

But let us bring a bill that does some reform. This bill tonight had no cap or no limit on what you could spend; it had no ban on soft money. What was passed in the House were noncontroversial issues, essentially saying that you have to be a United States citizen to contribute to a campaign. I am very curious that a House that has been so concerned about unfunded mandates would pass such a comprehensive law, requiring the FEC to monitor the nationality and the citizenship of everybody who contributes to a campaign either in kind or by money, because that is going to be very difficult to do, very difficult to enforce.

And so I think what we have passed here tonight is another huge unfunded mandate which may cripple the FEC, the Federal Elections Commission.

The other thing we did was to pass a bill that says let us file reports in a timely fashion electronically, and obviously that had overwhelming support. But this, my colleagues, is not campaign finance reform. Campaign finance reform has not been voted on by the House of Representatives, we have not dealt with the issue in a substantive way, we have not had a bipartisan bill on the floor, and, Mr. Speaker, as I close I hope that you will convey to your leader that we may have had a day discussing some bad bills, but we have not yet dealt with campaign finance reform.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. HUTCHINSON) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. HUTCHINSON addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. EWING) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. EWING addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. KINGSTON) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. KINGSTON addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

RECESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. SHIMKUS). Pursuant to clause 12 of rule I, the Chair declares the House in recess, subject to the call of the Chair.

Accordingly (at 11 o'clock and 12 minutes p.m.), the House stood in recess, subject to the call of the Chair.

AFTER RECESS

The recess having expired, the House was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. DREIER) at 12 o'clock and 48 minutes a.m.

REPORT ON RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 3579, EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998

Mr. GOSS, from the Committee on Rules, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 105–473) on the resolution (H. Res. 402) providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 3579) making emergency supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1998, and for other purposes, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.

REPORT ON RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 10, FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT OF 1998

Mr. GOSS, from the Committee on Rules, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 105–474) on the resolution (H. Res. 403) providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 10) to enhance competition in the financial services industry by providing a prudential framework for the affiliation of banks, securities firms, and other financial service providers, and for other purposes, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.

OMISSION FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD OF TUESDAY, MARCH 24, 1998

A PORTION OF THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL ORDER WAS INADVERTENTLY OMITTED

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LEWIS of Kentucky). Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 1997, the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. ISTOOK) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. ISTOOK. Mr. Speaker, I am thankful for the opportunity to address an extremely significant issue that relates to our schools, that relates to some of our most cherished principles as citizens of the United States of America and that unfortunately involves things which the courts of the United States have thrust upon the people despite the unwillingness of the people, in fact despite great concern and opposition by the public.

This relates, Mr. Speaker, to the matter of what happens in our public schools. It relates to the practices that have gone on for generations upon generations in this country involving prayer in public bodies, in particular, in our schools.

I am not talking about this just to be talking about it, Mr. Speaker. I am doing it because we are going to have an opportunity in the next few weeks here in the House of Representatives to vote on correcting what the courts in the United States have done, what the U.S. Supreme Court has done in its bans and restrictions and prohibitions on the practice of simple prayers being offered at public school. That particular legislation is the Religious Freedom Amendment, House Joint Resolution 78. I am privileged to be the principal sponsor of it. There are over 150 Members of this body who are sponsors as well. I would like to share with my colleagues the text of that. The Religious Freedom Amendment is very simple and straightforward and tries to return us to what were bedrock principles of this country until the Supreme Court began undercutting those principles some 36 years ago. The text is very straightforward and reads as follows as an amendment to the U.S. Constitution:

> To secure the people's right to acknowledge God according to the dictates of conscience, neither the United States nor any State shall establish any official religion, but the people's right to pray and to recognize their religious beliefs, heritage or traditions on public property, including schools, shall not be infringed. Neither the United States nor any State shall require any person to join in prayer or other religious activity, prescribe school prayers, discriminate against religion or deny equal access to a benefit on account of religion.

It is simple and it is straightforward. It states that just as the constitutions of every single State in this country state, we believe in the people's right to acknowledge God, and expressly mentions him, as the constitutions of the States do. No official religion, but not these restrictions that are put on prayer and positive expressions of religious faith but that are not applied to other forms of speech.

Why is religious speech singled out for discrimination? Mr. Speaker, in 1962, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that even when participation was voluntary and even if it was some sort of nonsectarian prayer, it was unconstitutional, they said, for school children to join together in a prayer in their classroom. That was followed by other Supreme Court decisions, Stone v. Graham in 1980, in which the U.S. Supreme Court said that the Ten Commandments could not be displayed on the walls of a public school. Mr. Speaker, I would note that that decision came out of your home State of Kentucky because it was Kentucky schools that had the practice. Groups would make copies of the Ten Commandments available and they would be hung with other important documents as the source of law as well as the source of spiritual guidance.

I notice, Mr. Speaker, here in the Chamber of this House as I am facing

and as the Speaker faces from the Speaker's dais, right there is the visage of Moses looking down on this Chamber, the great lawgiver who brought down from Mount Sinai the Ten Commandments which cannot be displayed in public schools. The U.S. Supreme Court says it is unconstitutional.

They went beyond that. They ruled in a case that came out of Pennsylvania, they ruled that a nativity scene and also a Jewish menorah could not be placed on public property during the holiday season unless right up there next to it you put nonreligious emblems, like plastic reindeer and Santa Claus and Frosty the Snowman. They had to be balanced. But, Mr. Speaker, I have never heard of any community that is required if they want to put out Santa Claus that they have to balance him with a nativity scene or a menorah or whatever it may be. It seems to be a one-way street.

The U.S. Supreme Court kept going. They had the case in 1985 of Wallace v. Jaffree. It came out of Alabama. Alabama had a law that said you can have a moment of silence to start the day at school, a moment of silence. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that was unconstitutional, because one of the permitted uses of that moment of silence was to enable students to have a silent prayer, and thus they said the whole moment of silence is even unconstitutional. And then a case upon which I would like to elaborate in 1992. By a 5–4 decision, the case of Lee v. Weisman out of Rhode Island, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled a prayer at a school graduation to be unconstitutional. It was a prayer that was offered by a Jewish rabbi. The court held it was unconstitutional.

All of these things, Mr. Speaker, are what the Supreme Court has done to twist and distort and undermine our First Amendment, the very first right mentioned in the First Amendment, Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Now, without even getting into the point of whether a school is creating an act of the Congress, and we are kind of two different bodies at two different levels, but to say that they are ignoring the part of the Constitution that says you do not prohibit the free exercise of religion, because what the Court did, Mr. Speaker, in all of these cases is to say that having a prayer or the Ten Commandments or a moment of silence or a nativity scene or a menorah, that that was the same as creating an official church. How absurd. An official church created just because you have a prayer? We open sessions of this Congress with a prayer. The House and the Senate, just like legislative bodies all around the country, be it State legislatures or city councils or private groups, Chamber of Commerce meetings, Kiwanis Club, Rotary Club, PTA meetings, people commonly open those things with prayer, just as we do here in Congress. It is normal. It does not make us a church just because we have a prayer. But the Supreme Court says, ''Oh, you have a prayer at school and you're turning the school into a church.'' Therefore, they ignore the free exercise clause of the Constitution.

We have been living under this for 36 years. The only way that we are going to be able to fix this is with the religious freedom amendment, to straighten out the courts, by saying that the things they have said are somehow wrong are indeed, as the American people believe, right.

I said I wanted to focus on a particular case. That was the case in 1992 of Lee v. Weisman. What I would like to do, Mr. Speaker, is in different evenings during these special orders in talking about the Religious Freedom Amendment, I think it is important to dissect and to help Members of this body as well as the general public to understand what the courts said so that we can understand the necessity of correcting it with the Religious Freedom Amendment. After all, that has been the method that we have used to correct Supreme Court decisions ever since the 1800s in America, including, for example, Supreme Court decisions such as the Dred Scott decision that were trying to uphold the practice of slavery. We made sure that it was outlawed.

Mr. Speaker, looking at the Lee v. Weisman case, and I would note, it is a 5–4 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. Had one justice, just one of the nine justices of the U.S. Supreme Court gone the other way, we would not have this same problem when it comes to being able to have a prayer at a school graduation. Yet because one justice would not go the other way, we have to get two-thirds of the House of Representatives, two-thirds of the Senate to approve a constitutional amendment, and of course then it has to be ratified by the legislatures in three-fourths of the States, all because by a margin of 5–4 the Supreme Court made this ruling.

This was a very strange ruling, Mr. Speaker, because the Supreme Court rested the whole decision on the notion that to expect someone during a prayer is psychological coercion that the majority of the Supreme Court equated with the same as using compulsion on someone to have a particular religion just because at this graduation the students were expected to be respectful, not only respectful of the prayer offered by the rabbi but respectful of the other speakers, respectful of the people as they came in as a group, as part of this graduation, respectful of the other people in attendance. But, oh, if it was respect for the rabbi's prayer, oh, there the Supreme Court said, ''Well, you can't expect people to be respectful of religion. After all, they may disagree.'' Okay. I disagree with many of the things said on the floor of this House. That does not mean that I have a right to silence and to censor the people who may say it. It is common in everyday life. In all sorts of settings, we hear things with which we disagree. That does not give us the right to censor and silence people. But this notion of political correctness which has been extended into schools is saying, ''Oh, but my goodness, if somebody doesn't like it, let's see if we can find an excuse to silence them,'' and they twist and distort the First Amendment to make it anti-religious instead of positive toward religion and use that as an excuse to silence people. Let us look at this decision. The decision came down from the U.S. Supreme Court June 24, 1992. The justices who said that this prayer at a school graduation was unconstitutional were Justices Kennedy, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor and Souder. Dissenting and, boy, did they dissent in very clear terms, dissenting were Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, the Chief Justice, White, and Thomas.

I am looking at the Supreme Court decision and for people that look up these things and want to look up the reference, which is called the citation, it is cited as 505 U.S. 577. That is 505 United States Reports, page 577. As the Court wrote, and Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the majority and a lot of organizations got involved in this, and I am glad to say, Mr. Speaker, by the way, that most of those who were arguing in favor of the graduation prayer are also supporters of the religious freedom amendment. The prayer actually happened in 1989. The Supreme Court took 3 years to make its decision. But it was a public school, Nathan Bishop Middle School in Providence, Rhode Island. There was a 14-year-old girl who was one of the graduates of middle school, her name was Deborah Weisman. At the time she was about 14 years old. Now, it was the policy in the schools and the superintendent to permit principals to invite members of the clergy to give invocations and benedictions. Often, it was not always but often they chose to make these part of the graduation ceremonies.

☐ 2230

The objector in this case was Deborah Weisman and her father Daniel Weisman. The school principal invited a Jewish rabbi to offer the prayer. The rabbi's name was Leslie Gutterman, and he was from the Temple Beth El in Providence, Rhode Island.

Now these were the two prayers that he offered Mr. Speaker, which the Supreme Court held were unconstitutional, and I think people can decide for themselves if they think there is something offensive here. The invocation offered by Rabbi Gutterman was as follows:

God of the free, hope of the brave, for the legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the rights of minorities are protected, we thank You. May these young men and women grow up to enrich it. For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these new graduates grow up to guard it. For the political process of America in which all its

citizens may participate, for its court system where all may seek justice, we thank You. May those we honor this morning always turn to it in trust. For the destiny of America, we thank You. May the graduates of Nathan Bishop Middle School so live that they might help to share it. May our aspirations for our country and for these young people who are our hope for the future be richly fulfilled. Amen.

So the invocation by Rabbi Gutterman even praised the very courts which later said that he violated the Constitution in doing so.

Then there is the benediction that the rabbi offered at the close of the graduation. These were the words that he pronounced:

O God, we are grateful to you for having endowed us with a capacity for learning which we have celebrated on this joyous commencement. Happy families give thanks for seeing their children achieve an important milestone. Send your blessings upon the teachers and administrators who helped prepare them. The graduates now need strength and guidance for the future. Help them to understand that we are not complete with academic knowledge alone. We must each strive to fulfill what you require of us all, to do justly, to love mercy, to walk humbly. We give thanks to you, Lord, for keeping us alive, sustaining us and allowing us to reach this special happy occasion. Amen.

That was the benediction offered by Rabbi Gutterman which again the U.S. Supreme Court, because someone chose to find it offensive, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional.

Now in this, Mr. Speaker, do you notice the case was brought by and on behalf of one student?

Now the Court does not tell us clearly just how big the class was. It was evidently, from other comments you know, a good-size graduating class from this middle school.

No one else joined in the court case to say I also object, just one student, and that is part of the problem with the standard, the erroneous standard that has been created by the Supreme Court. If one person objects, everyone else is censored. In fact, they have even said even if nobody does object, the possibility that somebody could object is enough to make us say that you should not have prayers at school graduations or prayers at the start of the school day.

Since when, Mr. Speaker, does something have to be unanimous before we can say it under free speech in the USA? And why should we restrict religious speech?

But let me get back to what Justice Kennedy wrote for this five—four-Court majority. He mentioned

* * * the parties stipulate attendance at these graduations is voluntary, and they also note the students stood for the Pledge of Allegiance, and then they remained standing for the rabbi's prayers,

and the court wrote that they assume that there was a respectful moment of silence just before and just after the prayers, but despite that, the rabbi's two prayers probably did not last much beyond a minute each, if even that much.

Now the school board, and by the way the United States of America through the Solicitor General's Office, sided with the school board. The Solicitor General filed a brief on behalf of the school. The school board argued that the short prayers and others like it are of profound meaning to many students and parents throughout the country. As Justice Kennedy noted, they consider that

* * * due respect and acknowledgment for divine guidance and for the deepest spiritual aspirations of our people ought to be expressed at an event as important in life as graduation.

Now first the plaintiffs, the Weismans, asked for a court injunction to stop the prayer from taking place. The court said we do not have time before the graduation, did not grant the injunction. They maintained the suit after the prayers were given, the court made the decision, oh, it should not have happened, it was unconstitutional, and they held, of course, a violation of the first amendment. They issued a permanent injunction against the school system there in Providence, Rhode Island, saying you are permanently enjoined, do not do this again, do not have one of these horrible prayers at school graduation.

Of course, I do not think it is horrible, I think it is normal. But the court held that it was unconstitutional, and on appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals agreed with the district court, as ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court did.

Now Justice Kennedy wrote, well, even though attendance is voluntary at graduation it is really kind of obligatory because you expect students to want to be at their graduation. And they found a lot of criticism with the fact that the actual invitation to the rabbi, rather than coming maybe from a student body officer or something like that, the fact that the invitation was extended by the principal of the school, the Supreme Court thought that was very significant. Now I do not know how that affected necessarily the nature of the prayer that the rabbi gave, but the rabbi was given a copy of different guidelines for civic occasions. And that was the name of the document, Guidelines for Civic Occasions, that the principal gave him and said, I hope your prayers are going to be nonsectarian. And, as the Court said, well, that was a State effort to control the prayer.

Now imagine that. They say we hope that you will offer a prayer that will be as acceptable as possible to people, and the Court says that is the same as controlling the content.

And then the Court went on to say that it is unconstitutional for the government to try to suggest that a prayer seek common ground. Really, they really said that. This is what Justice Kennedy wrote, these are his words:

If common ground can be defined which permits one's conflicting faiths to express the shared conviction that there is an ethic and morality which transcends human invention, the sense of community and purpose sought by all decent societies might be advanced. But though the First Amendment does not allow the government to stifle prayers which aspire to these ends, neither does it permit the government to undertake that task for itself.

I find it very interesting, Mr. Speaker, that Justice Kennedy says the first amendment does not allow the government to stifle prayers, and yet that is what the Supreme Court did in this very case. They stifled the prayers. They said that it may have happened that time but do not let us catch you doing it again.

Then Justice Kennedy said, ''Let's look at the position of the students, both those who desired the prayer and she who did not.''

Now that is interesting, it is in the plural. Those who desired the prayer, that is plural; and ''she,'' one person who did not want the prayer to occur.

Justice Kennedy wrote:

To endure the speech of false ideas or offensive content and then to counter it is part of learning how to live in a pluralistic society, a society which insists upon open discourse towards the ends of a tolerant citizenry. Against this background, students may consider it an odd measure of justice to be subjected during the course of their education to ideas deemed offensive and irreligious, but to be denied a brief formal prayer ceremony that the school offers in return.

Now, I am glad he noticed that. It does seem strange, Mr. Speaker, all the things that happen in schools, all the things that are advanced as part of school curriculums that so many people find distasteful and objectionable, whether it be things that relate to evolution, some people find offensive same-sex marriages, rainbow curriculums, a lot of the things that are done in public schools today that offend a great many people. But we are told we have to learn to live in a pluralistic society except when it comes to a situation such as a prayer, and then we are told, oh no, tolerance does not go that far, tolerance does not dictate that we listen to or respect religious expression on public property.

Here was the linchpin of what Justice Kennedy wrote. He went on to say:

The undeniable fact is that the school district's supervision and control of a high school graduation ceremony places public pressure as well as peer pressure on attending students to stand as a group or at least maintain respectful silence during the invocation and benediction. This pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.

Of course, in our culture, standing or remaining silent can signify adherence to a view or simple respect for views of others, and no doubt some persons who have no desire to join a prayer have little objection to standing as a sign of respect for those who do. But for the dissenter of high school age who has a reasonable perception that she is being forced by the State to pray in a manner her conscience will not allow, the injury is no less real. What matters is that, given our social conventions, a reasonable dissenter in this milieu could believe that the group exercise signified her own participation or approval of it.

Notice what Justice Kennedy said. People, by standing, do not indicate that they are agreeing with the prayer. People, by being quiet and respectful, that does not necessarily mean that they are joining in the prayer, becoming participants in it. But because one individual might think that that is the same as participating in a prayer in which they did not want to join, therefore you cannot have it.

You can teach people, you can teach our children at school, and I sure hope they do, Mr. Speaker. You can teach them to be tolerant and respectful and courteous about other things, but not to be respectful of religion or of prayer.

Justice Kennedy wrote further:

It is, we concede, a brief exercise during which the individual can concentrate on joining its message, meditate on her own religion, or let her mind wander. But the embarrassment and the intrusion of the religious exercise cannot be refuted by arguing that these prayers are of de minimis character. To do so would be an affront to the rabbi who offered them.

Can you understand that, Mr. Speaker? The Supreme Court ruled that we cannot say that it was just a minimal intrusion, because otherwise it would be insulting the rabbi, so instead of insulting the rabbi by saying that maybe there is somebody in the audience that did not want to hear the prayer, the Supreme Court says let us insult the rabbi by just saying you violated the Constitution.

□ 2245

What a remedy. They say that they knocked out the prayer to avoid insulting the rabbi who offered the prayer.

It is really hard for me, Mr. Speaker, to follow this psychological coercion test that Justice Kennedy and the majority of the Supreme Court wrote about in this decision. I think it is much more fruitful to look at what the four Justices wrote when they dissented, that being Justices Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Thomas.

This is what they wrote countering what the Supreme Court had done. I would like to advise you, Mr. Speaker, that it is the philosophy that was voiced by four Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in this dissent; it is that philosophy which is embodied in the Religious Freedom Amendment. In fact, in other cases impinging upon religious freedom, there were dissents filed by other Justices of the Supreme Court.

We have taken to heart what they said, and what they believe is the proper interpretation of the Constitution and I think what the American people believe is the proper interpretation. We have sought to incorporate that in the religious freedom amendment upon which we will soon be voting.

So let us look then at what these four Justices wrote through Justice Scalia. Talking about the majority ruling, they wrote:

As its instrument of destruction, the bulldozer of social engineering, the Court invents a boundless and boundlessly manipulable test of psychological coercion; lays waste a tradition that is as old as public school graduations themselves, and that is a component of an even more long-standing American tradition.

Today's opinion shows more forcibly than volumes of argumentation why our Nation's protection, that fortress which is our Constitution, cannot possibly rest upon the changeable, philosophical predilections of the Justices of this Court, but must have deep foundations in the historic practices of our people.

They went on to discuss, Mr. Speaker, some of the historic practices of prayer in public settings. As they wrote,

* * * the history and tradition of our Nation are replete with public ceremonies featuring prayers of thanksgiving and petition.

In his first inaugural address, after swearing his oath of office on a Bible, George Washington deliberately made a prayer part of his first official act as President. Such supplication has been a characteristic feature of inaugural addresses ever since.

Thomas Jefferson, for example, prayed in his first inaugural address. In his second inaugural address, Jefferson acknowledged his need for divine guidance and invited his audience to join his prayer.

Reading further from the Court dissent,

* * * similarly, James Madison, in his first inaugural address, placed his confidence in the guardianship and guidance of that Almighty Being whose power regulates the destiny of nations.

Most recently, President Bush, continuing the tradition established by President Washington, asked those attending his inauguration to bow their heads and made a prayer his first official act as President.

Reading further from Justice Scalia,

* * * the day after the First Amendment was proposed, Congress urged President Washington to proclaim a day of public thanksgiving and prayer to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many and signal favors of Almighty God. President Washington responded by declaring Thanksgiving for November 26, 1789.

Reading further from the dissent in the Lee v. Weisman case,

* * * the other two branches of the Federal Government also have a long-established practice of prayer at public events. As we detailed in Marsh v. Chambers, congressional sessions have opened with a chaplain's prayer ever since the first Congress. And this Court's own sessions have opened with the invocation ''God save the United States and this Honorable Court'' since the days of Chief Justice Marshall.

In addition to this general tradition of prayer at public ceremonies, there exists a more specific tradition of invocations and benedictions at public school graduation exercises.

By one account, the first public high school graduation ceremony took place in Connecticut in July 1868, the very month, as it happens, that the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, when 15 seniors from the Norwich Free Academy marched in their best Sunday suits and dresses into a church hall and waited through majestic music and long prayers.

As the Court acknowledges in describing the customary features of high school graduations, the invocation and benediction have long been recognized to be as traditional as any other parts of the school graduation program and are widely established.

Yet, Mr. Speaker, despite what 4 dissenting Justices were telling them in the words which I am reading to you, Mr. Speaker, despite that, just by a margin of 5 to 4, the Supreme Court said you should not have prayer at school graduations.

Now, these dissenting 4 Justices, Mr. Speaker, they turned their attention then to the argument, this psychological coercion argument that had been made by Justice Kennedy on behalf of the majority. Let me read you what they wrote about this.

According to the Court, students in graduation who want to avoid the fact or appearance of participation in the invocation and benediction are psychologically obligated by public pressure as well as peer pressure to stand as a group or at least maintain respectful silence during those prayers.

This assertion, the very linchpin of the Court's opinion, is almost as intriguing for what it is does not say as for what it says. It does not say, for example, that students are psychologically coerced to bow their heads, to place their hands in a prayerful position, to pay attention to the prayers, to utter amen, or in fact to pray.

It claims only that the psychological coercion consists of being coerced to stand or at least maintain respectful silence. That is all anybody was coerced to do. Nobody was required to join in a prayer. They were just expected to be respectful.

Mr. Speaker, it is a sad day when students in public schools are not taught to be respectful even, and perhaps especially, when somebody is saying or doing something with which they disagree.

The 4 dissenting Justices called the arguments of their 5 brethren ''ludicrous.'' That is their word for it, ludicrous. But they wrote further,

* * * let us assume the very worst, that the nonparticipating graduate is suddenly coerced to stand. Even that does not remotely establish a participation or an appearance of participation in a religious exercise.

The Court acknowledges that in our culture, standing can signify adherence to a view or simple respect for the views of others. But if it is a permissible inference that one who is standing is doing so simply out of respect for the prayers of others, then how can it possibly be said that a reasonable dissenter could believe that the group exercise signifies her own participation or approval.

The opinion manifests that the Court itself has not given careful consideration to its test of psychological coercion. For if it had, how could it observe with no hint of concern or disapproval that the student stood for the pledge of allegiance which immediately preceded Rabbi Gutterman's invocation?

Does that not ring a bell, Mr. Speaker? Is that now how we open our sessions of this Congress? We stand together, and we say the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag that is draped behind you, Mr. Speaker, and a prayer is offered. The Supreme Court said that that simple pattern was unconstitutional in a public school setting.

Now, about this requirement of standing, which is the only thing that any student was asked, not compelled, but they said, well, it was coercion. It was coercion to expect him to stand, even though they were not forced to.

As Justice Scalia wrote in the dissent,

* * * if students were psychologically coerced to remain standing during the invocation, they must also have been psychologically coerced moments before to stand for, and thereby, in the Court's view, to take part in or appear to take part in the Pledge of Allegiance. Must the Pledge, therefore, be barred from the public schools?

I mention that, Mr. Speaker, because there is another U.S. Supreme Court decision, it is 50 years old now, 50 years old this year, relating to the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools. I think, Mr. Speaker, that it incorporates the proper standard, whether you are talking about at the graduation or the classroom setting, the proper standard.

Because in that case, which came out of West Virginia, West Virginia versus Barnette, the U.S. Supreme Court said no child can be compelled to say the Pledge of Allegiance. That is fine with me, Mr. Speaker. I do not want to compel someone to say the Pledge of Allegiance if they do not wish to say it. But what the Court did not do was to say that, because one child objects or might object, therefore, they can stop the other children from saying the Pledge of Allegiance.

That ought to be the standard that applies to prayer, to voluntary prayer at public schools or at a school graduation. No one is compelled to participate. The Religious Freedom Amendment makes that explicit. You cannot require any person to join in prayer or other religious activity, but that does not give you the right to censor and silence those who do.

And as Justice Scalia noted here, does this mean that under this test that the Supreme Court applied to graduation prayer, now we are going to have to go back and ban the Pledge of Allegiance from our public schools? Because it is the same coercion to be respectful for that.

Mr. Speaker, it is long overdue that we correct decisions like this that have come from the U.S. Supreme Court, decisions that have used the First Amendment not as a shield of protection for religious freedom of the U.S.A., but as a weapon to stifle simple prayers, simple expressions of faith, whether it be at a school graduation or in a classroom.

Let me read some of the last words that were written by the 4 Justices who stood strong for our values and our traditions and dissented from this decision in Lee versus Weisman. Here is what they wrote in closing their decision or their dissent:

The reader has been told much in this case about the personal interest of Mr. Weisman and his daughter and very little about the personal interests on the other side. They are not inconsequential. Church and State would not be such a difficult subject if religion were, as the Court apparently thinks it to be, some purely personal avocation that can be indulged entirely in secret, like pornography in the privacy of one's room. For most believers, it is not that and has never been.

Religious men and women of almost all denominations have felt it necessary to acknowledge and beseech the blessing of God as a people and not just as individuals, because they believe in the protection of Divine Providence, as the Declaration of Independence put it, not just for individuals, but for societies.

One can believe in the effectiveness of such public worship or one can deprecate and deride it, but the long-standing American tradition of prayer at official ceremonies displays with unmistakable clarity that the establishment clause does not forbid the government to accommodate it.

Nothing, absolutely nothing * * *

the closing words of Justice Scalia,

Nothing, absolutely nothing is so inclined to foster among religious believers of various faiths a toleration, no, an affection for one another than voluntarily joining in prayer together. No one should be compelled to do that, but it is a shame to deprive our public culture of the opportunity and, indeed, the encouragement for people to do it voluntarily.

The Baptist or Catholic who heard and joined in the simple and inspiring prayers of Rabbi Gutterman on this official and patriotic occasion was inoculated from religious bigotry and prejudice in a manner that cannot be replicated.

To deprive our society of that important unifying mechanism in order to spare the nonbeliever what seems to me the minimal inconvenience of standing or even sitting in respectful nonparticipation is as senseless in policy as it is unsupported in law.

□ 2300

We have had a lot of senseless decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court when it comes to prayer in public schools, at graduation, the ability to have the Ten Commandments displayed in public places, or a nativity scene, a menorah, or it might be an emblem of some other religious holiday at an appropriate time of celebration. But, Mr. Speaker, to strip away the history, the culture, the tradition, the beliefs, the faith and the heritage of the people of the United States of America, not by a joint decision of the people of this country, but by bare majorities or even a 9-to-0 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, to tromp upon the beliefs and convictions of the people of this country is not justified by the First Amendment.

Mr. Speaker, I do not want to change the Constitution to fix this, but there is no other way, because the Supreme Court has already distorted our First Amendment, using it as a weapon against public expression of faith; using it to censor and to silence simple prayers of hope and faith by children in our schools.

The Religious Freedom Amendment, Mr. Speaker, addresses this, and we will be addressing it in the next few weeks. It has been approved by the Subcommittee on the Constitution; it has been approved by the House Committee on the Judiciary; it will be coming to this floor for a vote, to correct decisions such as this one and others of the U.S. Supreme Court.

I repeat, Mr. Speaker, a simple text, the Religious Freedom Amendment:

To secure the people's right to acknowledge God according to the dictates of conscience. Neither the United States nor any State shall establish any official religion, but the people's right to pray and to recognize the religious beliefs, heritage or traditions on public property, including schools, shall not be infringed. Neither the United States nor any State shall require any person to join in prayer or other religious activity, proscribe school prayers, discriminate against religion, or deny equal access to a benefit on account of religion.

Religion is something that is good in this country. It has had a positive influence ever since it motivated the pilgrims to come to America and to found this Nation, because they sought religious freedom; they sought the protections that the Supreme Court would deny people today.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the Religious Freedom Amendment. To those who have not joined the more than 150 cosponsors, I invite them to join and put their name on this amendment and join with us today in that. I hope that their constituents will call their offices and tell them they need to be supporting the Religious Freedom Amendment, they need to put their name on it. They need to be helping Congressman Istook and the others who are supporting this.

Mr. Speaker, this is something that is so vital because our cherished first freedom is being undercut by the Supreme Court that is supposed to be its guardian, and the Constitution sets up a system where if something goes wrong with interpretation of the Constitution, we offer an amendment, because we, Mr. Speaker, are charged to be the protectors of what the Founding Fathers intended, and the Religious Freedom Amendment helps us to provide that protection.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. COBLE (at the request of Mr. ARMEY) for today and March 31 until 1 p.m., on account of official business.

Mr. CANNON (at the request of Mr. ARMEY) for today and the balance of the week, on account of the birth of his child.

Mr. BEREUTER (at the request of Mr. ARMEY) for today, on account of official business.

Mr. SOLOMON (at the request of Mr. ARMEY) for today, on account of official business.

Mr. BLILEY (at the request of Mr. ARMEY) for today, on account of official business.

Mr. YATES (at the request of Mr. GEPHARDT) for today, on account of physical reasons.

Mr. CARDIN (at the request of Mr. GEPHARDT) for today, on account of a death in the family.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. FOLEY) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)